The 65th Infantry Regiment
by Lieutenant Colonel
Baltazar (Bart) Soto
by Jim Jarboe)
Fox and Able
October 28, 1952
a day that the soldiers of the 65th Infantry of the time will never
Even today, every year on that unforgettable day, retired Colonel
Wilcomb calls retired Colonel Willis “Bud” Cronkhite and proposes a toast. Gerald Wilcomb is convinced that they are living on
time and should never have survived that day. Two old soldiers
to an incredible day they cannot forget!
Sometime after midnight October
1952, Ben Farnan of the 3rd Recon Company
moaning from the mine field in front of his position. His
was in front of “Iron
which was later to be called Jackson
From what he was hearing, he knew that someone had wondered into the
in front of the Main Line of
Resistance (MLR). Together with his Company Commander and
two other soldiers, he went forward in the safe lane and marked the
spot and direction where
the moaning was coming from with a small sapling. Once the sun
up, Farnan and a buddy went forward with a
to find the wounded soldier. Farnan
through the minefield first and his buddy followed in his
They found the wounded soldier, who had both his legs shattered by a
and evacuated him on a stretcher. Ben Farnan
still wonders if the soldier survived his wounds. To this day Ben
who that soldier was.
As the sun rose on October 28, 1952,
Captain Willis “Bud” Cronkhite was
he and his men had not slept. They were up all night preparing to
a counter attack at first light. His command, F (Fox) Company,
Battalion, 65th Infantry had to first, hand over their portion of the
to the 3rd Recon Company, then form up for attack that morning.
The night before Captain George
G (George) Company had fought a desperate battle to hang onto the high
around Hill 391. After receiving orders to withdraw, CPT Jackson
the remnants of his battered company in a fighting retreat. Since
were completely surrounded and the Chinese had penetrated their
they had to fight their way back to the MLR in the dark. Jackson
is retired now and is convinced his company would have been completely
wiped out that night if they had not been ordered to retreat.
heroic battle between 25 and 28 October 1952, the Outpost on Hill
of Iron Horse
in his honor, (see Watch on the Rhine
Article of October 2001).
Colonel Chester De Gavre appeared upset that G Company had been
from Jackson Heights.
He fully expected the outpost to be held, no matter what the cost.
Captain Jackson, would be personally
by the Regimental Commander himself. When reading the interview
the historical records, I thought it read more like an
There were many detailed questions about CPT Jackson’s defense of the
outpost. As a result of the battle, policy changes were
The standing orders, which allowed local commanders to make decisions
when to withdraw an outpost, were eventually changed. The new
would only allow the Division Commander himself to authorize a retreat,
big example of micromanagement of tactical operations by higher
that plagued leaders in the Korean War.
Willis "Bud" Cronkhite
CPT Bud Cronkhite
crossed the line of departure
(LD) and launched his attack at 0645 hours, 28 October 1952.
the attack from his Command Post was LTC Carlos Betances-Ramirez,
Commander 2nd Battalion, 65th
The Regimental Commander, COL
De Gavre arrived at the Command Post and
observed the attack. Able Company was attached to 2nd Battalion
their operational control. LTC Betances
briefed the Regimental Commander about his plan of attack. Betances stated "we had made counter attack
days before...the plan consisted of Fox attacking...and Able to be
to pass through, reinforce, relief etc." MAJ Harry M. Elam, the new
Officer for 2nd Battalion, explained the Operations Order he issued as
“Fox (Company) in the lead,
(Company) following Fox moving in columns of companies…the axis of
up the “choggie path” toward Jackson
Company was assigned the mission objective “Able”, which geographically
a southern slope of Jackson Heights…Able Company , upon seizure of
Able by Fox(Company) was to pass through Fox Company, seize objective
which was the crest of the hill known as Jackson Heights or 391.
order, Fox Company was to be withdrawn and Able Company was to continue
Carlos Betances Ramirez
immediately expressed his dislike of the plan. The Regimental Commander
"since he (LTC Betances) had lost the hill
night before, he would occupy it with his own company (Fox Company) and
Company A as soon as the position was secure… Company A was to be under
Control only for the attack and then to revert to commanding officer
Battalion." 1st Battalion was then in regimental reserve.
Betances was frustrated and
It was Army doctrine that the outpost was to be occupied by the Reserve
He now had no command authority to control units under his operational
and the Regimental Commander was determining how Companies would be
As a loyal soldier, LTC Betances followed
new changed orders, made them his own, and immediately tried to contact
Company Commanders and inform them of the new orders. As
happens in combat operations, once the units had moved out for their
communications broke down between the attacking companies and their
headquarters. The Company Commanders could not be reached
CPT Bud Cronkhite
personally led his company, waving his golf stick
in the air and inspiring his men by setting the example and leading
He was followed closely by his artillery forward observer, 1LT Gerald Wilcomb, who had also spent a sleepless night
his Forward Observer team to accompany the unit. CPT Cronkhite directed the positioning of his
guns and sent his weapons platoon to provide fire support from his
flank. The weapons platoon not only had machine guns, but had
to borrow a Quad 50 machine gun. The four 50 caliber machine guns
the heights covering the advance. At one point during the
LT Wilcomb observed CPT Cronkhite
running forward and being fired at by a Chinese machine gun.
Bud was able to see the tracers approaching him and dive for
The Chinese were firing their machine guns and throwing sticks of
and satchel charges down on the attacking Fox Company soldiers. A
recoilless rifle team was able to score a direct hit on the enemy
gun, knocking it out.
Finally, Fox Company seized their
objective, the “first knoll” of Jackson
The men deployed into position to defend their objective. Casualties
were light. Only one of Cronkhite’s
was killed and three soldiers were wounded. It was 0955.
Chinese began to shell the position.
Things were not as simple for
Able Company, which followed. 1LT John Porterfield,
was the Company Commander. The Chinese were surprised by Fox
Company rapid attack, but as Able Company moved forward behind Fox the
enemy was already
alerted. Able Company attracted plenty of attention. The
platoon in the company column, the Weapons Platoon lead by the Company
Officer, 1LT Juan Guzman, was pinned down in the valley short of Jackson
1LT Porterfield managed to continue his attack with his remaining rifle
platoons and joined CPT Cronkhite’s Fox
Company at about 1010 hours.
The Chinese were shelling Jackson
120mm mortar, and direct fire 76mm cannon. The soldiers of the
companies were now pinned down on the position under complete
observation by the enemy. Since Jackson
solid granite rock, the troops had to take cover and find fighting
best they could behind a rock or in a shallow depression. The few
that had existed before had all been destroyed by the previous night’s
Once the Chinese had seized the position the night before, they
off whatever bunkers they encountered with satchel charges.
were bodies and parts of bodies everywhere from the previous battles
the disputed outpost. Dead Chinese, South Koreans, Puerto Ricans,
Continentals littered the area. The smell was nauseating.
Wilcomb jumped into a position, which CPT Cronkhite pointed out to him. He
finding a dead Puerto Rican Sergeant. He quickly gave up the
and looked for another.
John D. Porterfield
1LT Porterfield moved forward to
make his leaders reconnaissance and personally
take a look at his objective, the second knoll and crest of Jackson
objective “Baker”. The Chinese had machine guns firing at anyone who
themselves over the crest. Objective Baker was heavily defended.
only avenue of approach, the foot path up the heights, was well covered
enemy machine gun fire. There was no cover or concealment. 1LT
had to figure out how to continue his attack across the open terrain
enemy was sweeping with fire. The only course of action left to
was a direct frontal attack. Porterfield moved to Cronkhite’s position and asked if Bud could help
evacuate all his wounded and the many additional wounded he anticipated
would suffer in his continued attack. Cronkhite
agreed. Since Fox Company was to return to the MLR anyway, he had
problem helping Able Company with his wounded. This he knew would
Porterfield’s manpower for the main assault on his objective.
While the two Company
were together a wire telephone land line was finally hooked up and CPT Cronkhite received his first phone call directly
from Battalion Headquarters. It was early in the afternoon.
Commander, LTC Betances was on the
Orders were changed. Able Company was to return and Fox Company
to stay and defend Jackson
Bud was totally surprised!
About that time 1LT Wilcomb walked over to the Able Company Forward
LT Glasgow, and gave him his cigarettes and telephone, which he
would be useful while Able Company was staying to defend Jackson
Then he received word of the changed orders. Fox Company would be
1LT Wilcomb took back the items he had
thought about what a screwed up situation he was in. Another SNAFU.
Able Company Officers were
close together. Wilcomb walked away
the group of officers to make a communications check with his Battalion
his radio, since he now had to remain on Jackson
There was a loud, ear
blast, which pushed Wilcomb down on the
When he regained his senses and turned around to see what had happened
saw that a shell had made a direct hit on the group of officers he had
been with. They were all dead, 1LT Porterfield, LT Glasgow, LT
from Able Company and LT Gibbs from Fox. All the Able
officers on Jackson
Corporal Nick Santiago was
as 1LT Porterfield’s Radio Operator at the time and was in a covered
position nearby. He witnessed the shell hit 1LT
Porterfield. He still
cannot get the image of what he saw out of his mind. Till this
Corporal Santiago cannot understand why he survived and his beloved
Commander did not.
Word spread quickly among the
men, “the Company Commander and all the officers were dead!”
A medic assigned to Fox
3rd Platoon still remembers clearly what happened on Jackson
He was up most of the night before treating the wounded from G Company,
had retreated from Jackson
He remembered that they had been told, as they were preparing for the
that Fox Company would not be staying on Jackson Heights, another
was coming up to relieve them. As his platoon made it up to the
with Fox Company, he saw Able Company come up and join them. He
LT Gibbs killed. His platoon then began to withdraw. He
it was perfectly OK. After all, Able Company was supposed to
eventually began to notice that in small groups or singly, wounded
and soldiers “helping them” were leaving the position. One
the soldiers offered him the magazine from his carbine as he
As Wilcomb looked into the valley he saw
“stung out in the valley below heading south”. They were headed
to the MLR.
It was difficult if not
to see all of the defensive positions from one spot on Jackson
From what CPT Cronkhite could see, some of
soldiers were helping evacuate the A Company wounded along with his own
wounded. This was according to the orders he had issued to assist
He shouted to a Lieutenant he saw down in the valley to come on up with
his platoon. The unknown Lieutenant refused and yelled back to
Cronkhite should, “Come down, there is no
left, come down.” Perhaps that Lieutenant was 1LT Juan
the only surviving officer of Able Company? Cronkhite
could not tell because he was too far away.
1LT Guzman had been in Korea
only eight days and this was his first day of combat. He had
to move his platoon as far as the base of Jackson
not or would not move further forward. One of the Able Company
soldiers retreating from Jackson
Guzman that the Company Commander and all the Able Company officers
dead. 1LT Guzman claimed that his platoon had been pinned down ever
Able Company had begun its attack. Upon hearing this news, Guzman
to withdraw his platoon to a bunker on Hill 270, also known as Outpost
approximately halfway back to the MLR. After that, 1LT Guzman and
men took no active part in the battle. Although he was the
officer still alive in Able Company and was the Acting Company
he refused orders to move forward with his remaining platoon.
Company had not completed its mission. Objective Baker had not
taken. 1LT Guzman refused orders to continue the attack to
Baker and did nothing to rally the retreating soldiers of Able
For this he would be court-martialed.
CPT Bud Cronkhite
and his men continued to endure the unrelenting shelling while staying
behind available cover on Jackson
Bud had lost communications again with Battalion since his radio was
unserviceable and his telephone lines had been cut by the enemy
shelling. At approximately
1700 hours CPT Cronkhite checked the
his company. It was then that he became aware that all his Enlisted Men
gone. All that was left were his officers. Soon it would be
He then gathered together his officers, his Platoon Leaders, LTs Doan, Barker, Atterbery,
and his Forward Observer, 1LT Wilcomb.
He gave them a direct order to withdraw back to the MLR.
of the Lieutenants said, “You don’t have to order me to go back to the
line. I’ve been ready to leave this place for hours!” CPT Cronkhite already realized his predicament and
explained that he was ordering them back because, if there was a
of them was abandoning their positions. They were only following
The officers began their
retreat. They slid down the steep slope of Jackson
Heights to the
valley below. There they met a South Korean supply party loaded
with the supplies they would need to defend the position. CPT Cronkhite ordered four of them to carry back a
with the body of his severely wounded Lieutenant. The rest the
Korean’s he “shooed” away back to the MLR.
Along the chogie path during their retreat back to the
Cronkhite and his officers found they were
“escorted” by Chinese fire. They had to run, then
dive for cover along the way to avoid the shells. 1LT Wilcomb was sure a 76mm gun was firing on
It was a wild trip back to friendly lines. Along the way Wilcomb sprained both his ankles, but fear gave
the will power to make it back despite his injuries.
Back on the main line COL
De Gavre was in the 2nd Battalion Command
along with LTC Carlos Betances-Ramirez.
When the news arrived that a large group of men had returned to the
Betances ran forward to see the situation
himself. He talked to the Enlisted
who had abandoned Jackson
to them first in English. When that failed he switched and spoke
them in fluent Spanish. He ordered them to return back to the
rejoin their officers, and do their duty. He explained that
glory and pride of Puerto Rico
Regiment depended on them. Only a hand full gathered around one
the Sergeants to return. LTC Betances
warned them of the penalty should they refuse his order. One of
soldiers told him, “Sir. If we stay here we may receive the death
in a court-martial. If we go back there we will all die for sure,
or later a shell will get you. I will take my chances back here.”
was in the process of arresting the insubordinate soldiers and taking
down their names, when he saw CPT Cronkhite
and his officer’s return. It was a relief to him that at least
his officers had all made it back alive. Some of the Enlisted Men
had claimed that
all the officers on Jackson
COL De Gavre then arrived on the scene asking questions
what was going on. He then spoke to CPT Cronkhite.
They climbed into his jeep and drove off to Division Headquarters.
CPT Bud Cronkhite
was dog-tired from lack of sleep and the ordeal he had just been
that day. On the jeep trip to Division Headquarters COL
De Gavre talked to Cronkhite.
The Regimental Commander told him point blank that he had a decision to
make, whether to court-martial him or give him a medal. Someone
had to pay
for the “screw up” at Jackson
COL De Gavre did not think he was responsible in any
despite his own micromanagement of operations. Two companies from
different battalions in his regiment had failed to accomplish their
He was searching for a scapegoat, someone to blame for the
Cronkhite was numb, and really didn’t know
to think or feel. Once they arrived at the Division Command Post,
meeting was held between COL
De Gavre the 3rd Division Commanding
and the Deputy Commanding General.
For his heroism on October 28, 1952, CPT Cronkhite was awarded the Silver Star. 1LT
posthumously received the Bronze Star with V devise and was promoted to
Despite the fact that he had done
his duty and taken all possible actions a Battalion Commander could do
the circumstances he faced that day, on 30 October 1952, LTC Carlos Betances-Ramirez
was formally relieved of his command. MAJ Elam, the 2nd Battalion
Officer who had issued the order of attack, was given command of 2nd
A few days later the Continental Battalion Commander of the 1st
which commanded Able Company, was promoted.
During the period following
the battle of Jackson Heights, Ninety-two Puerto Rican soldiers of the
65th Infantry were court-martialed including the only officer
1LT Juan Guzman. These were the largest mass court-martials of
entire Korean War.
By March 1953 the 65th Infantry
Regiment was fully integrated and ceased being “the Puerto Rican
then the 65th was an infantry regiment just like all the other infantry
It’s Puerto Rican soldiers were integrated
into all the units in 8th Army and the percentage of Puerto Rican
in the 65th dropped to only about 5%.
The word “transformation” is used
today to explain the changes in the U.S.
Army to prepare for the future. In 1952 the United
States and the Army were still
in the process of an important transformation. It was a
in the way we thought about and treated our fellow man.
this transformation was extremely difficult, many mistakes were made,
careers destroyed, and lives lost.
The world in the 1950’s was very
than it is today in race relations area. As a child I have strong
of what personally happened to me and my family. The only way to
is to tell the truth the way I see it. It seems ironic that it
so long in our country for people to recognize that we are all created
We proudly announced in its own Declaration of Independence, “We hold
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights…”
The proud soldiers of the 65th
Infantry from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, upon leaving
to join the Army in Korea, were already young adults. They were
for a rude awakening on their ocean voyage to Korea.
Most had never left their tropical islands. The troops of the
learned that they were considered “inferior” by many Continental
and officers. For the first time in their lives these men
the cruel unforgiving hatred of racism. They were stressed by the
in climate, different food, and different culture. The Puerto
soldiers had the additional problem of having to learn a foreign
They were all Americans when it came to fighting and possibly dying for
country, but were not treated with respect and dignity by their fellow US
The Pentagon brass had considered
the 65th Infantry a “Rum and Coca-Cola outfit”. Some Officers,
Generals in the Army chain of command, thought that the regiment was
therefore; unreliable. This was despite the fact that many of the
Rican troops were White. The Puerto Ricans did not discriminate
their countrymen who were different colors. One enlightened
Officer told me that he had never seen such abuse of troops in his
military career as what he saw while serving in the regiment in 1952.
There is no doubt that
and discrimination played a part in what eventually happened to the
In a staff study prepared by a 3rd Division staff officer, shortly
the battle of Jackson Heights, great care was taken to explain that all
Officers in the 65th were outstanding, (and absolve them of any blame
the performance of the regiment). This statement was clearly
to protect the Continental Officers and blame the Puerto Rican soldiers
for the results of the battle.
The new Commander of the 3rd
Division, Major General George W. Smythe,
stated to his Operations Officer that he wanted all the Puerto Ricans
out of his Division
so it would look like any other Division in Korea.
Rather than correcting the severe Non Commissioned Officer shortages
problems of the 65th the 3rd Division Commander seized on the combat
of the regiment at Outpost Kelly and Jackson
remove the Puerto Ricans out of his Division. The regiment was
integrated after the mass court-martial of over 92 of its
The Division Commander accomplished his objective.
The attempts by the Continental
in the 65th Infantry Regiment to instill a punishing discipline of the
after the battle for Outpost Kelly (September 1952) was poorly
and executed. It backfired. The order issued by the new
De Gavre, for all soldiers to shave their
mustaches until they could prove they were “real men”, was considered
an insult by
the Puerto Rican soldiers. The deliberate change in rations from
accustomed Puerto Rican “rice and beans” to Continental “hot dogs and
was interpreted as another demeaning slap in the face by these Hispanic
Troops were heard to say the new Regimental Commander did not
Puerto Ricans. The order to remove the regimental motto, “Borinqueneers” from their vehicles was yet
demeaning insult. Troop morale plummeted and there was a severe
of confidence and respect for their leaders.
Additional evidence of
is that despite the failures the regiment experienced on Jackson
not one Continental officer was punished in the 65th. Everyone
was relieved or court-martialed was Puerto Rican, in spite of the fact
most of the officers and commanders of the units of the 65th were
The Puerto Rican draftees of 1952
were severely punished by an uncaring
chain of command intent on making an example out of them to cover for
own leadership mistakes and failures. This is the same chain of
that ignored similar incidents during several other “Bug Out” incidents
Continental units during the same time period of the war. There
a double standard in which the soldiers of the 65th were punished but
soldiers from other Continental Regiments were forgiven.
First line leadership was very
in the 65th Infantry. The soldiers of the 65th Infantry at the
of the battle of Jackson
few Sergeants, Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to provide first line
Most of the squad leaders were fellow draftee soldiers who had just
So Privates were being lead into combat by fellow Privates who had been
promoted to Private First Class and given the responsibility of Squad
leader. In many cases Platoons only had a Corporal as the Platoon
Sergeant. Leadership was in short supply and if the officers
became casualties the soldiers
would quickly become confused and not know what to do. This is
what happened at Jackson Heights with A Company.
The NCO leadership problem could
have been resolved by the assignment of bilingual Puerto Rican NCO’s who were being shipped to Korea
to serve in the 65th, however; the Army in Korea chose to divert these
leaders to other units in Korea, depriving the 65th of the sergeants it
desperately needed. So in 1952 the Army in Korea
was warehousing its Spanish speaking Enlisted Men in one unit and
diverting Puerto Rican Sergeants off to other units. The 65th was
being set up
for eventual disaster. How can a unit be expected to perform its
mission without Sergeants? The results of this policy, is what
at Jackson Heights.
Some have blamed all the
Regiments problems on the “language barrier”. The language
barrier had always
been present in the 65th ever since the unit was created in
It had been overcome by well trained and experienced Sergeants in the
This was proven from the day the 65th arrived in Korea in September
through 1951, when the 65th distinguished itself in numerous battles
the Pusan perimeter, fighting in North
with XX Corps and constant combat with its sister regiments in the 3rd
fighting its way back north from the Han River to the Iron Triangle.
Training was another factor that
to be looked at when determining what happened. By
1952 the 65th Infantry was operating with at least 1/3 of its soldiers
brand new green replacements. Most of those soldiers only had
training and what little unit training their commanders could give them
breaks in combat. Due to the unique language problems of the
Rican soldier, additional training was needed.
Recently an Army historian stated
that the Company Commanders were confused on Jackson
My investigation has revealed that the Company Commander knew exactly
was expected of them. One of them died trying to follow the
he had received. The last minute change issued by the Regimental
Commander caused a change in orders once the units reached Objective
Able, but the Company
Commanders understood their new orders and did their best to accomplish
In summary, the racial
of the 1950’s, Army policies in Korea, senior leadership failures from
the Regimental Commander and higher, shortage of NCO’s,
a self inflicted language barrier, and insufficient training destroyed
the morale and fighting ability of a once proud and distinguished
regiment which had gallantly served and proven itself for two years in
Perhaps Brigadier General Thomas
E. Phillips said it best when he wrote a letter to the St.
Louis Post Dispatch on 27 January 1953
stated, “The Army has failed to recognize the peculiar problems of
and commanding men who are basically as foreign as the Spanish or the
BG Phillips came close to describing the problem, but too late to save
unique regiment of American Soldiers.
American society and the U.S.
Army have both made enormous improvements and overcome most of the
despicable behavior of 50 years ago. Treating your soldiers with
respect is a
part of leadership that is stressed in the leadership training of
As one of the Continental Officers of the 65th told me, “It is a poor
who blames his tools”.
Today the 65th Infantry continues
to serve as an element of the Puerto Rico
National Guard. Yes, the 65th Infantry has endured and is again,
the Puerto Rican Regiment! Some of its soldiers have been
the war against terror and cherish the regimental motto, “Honor and
In September 2000, then Secretary
of the Army, Louis Caldera made a speech at Arlington
to commemorate the Veterans of the 65th Infantry. I was
In part of his speech he stated:
“But even as the 65th struggled
deadly enemies in the field, they were fighting a rearguard action
a more insidious adversary - the cumulative effects of ill-conceived
policies, leadership shortcomings, and especially racial and
prejudices, all exacerbated by America's unpreparedness
for war and the growing pains of an Army forced by law and
to carry out racial integration. Together these factors would take
toll on the 65th, leaving scars that have yet to heal for so many of
regiment's proud and courageous soldiers.”
I observed veterans in the crowd
crying when they heard this confession from the Secretary of the
Army! While other nations battle for centuries with tribal and
racial hate and prejudice, only in America
can such a change occur in the hearts of our citizens so quickly.
In 2001 the Center
of Military History
published a historical review which exonerated LTC Carlos Betances-Ramirez, the 2nd Battalion Commander of
65th Infantry who was relieved shortly after the battle of Jackson
afterward in October 2001, while seriously ill in the hospital, LTC Betances-Ramirez was presented the Bronze Star
had earned 49 years previously, thanks to the untiring efforts of
son of his Fox Company Commander, Willis Cronkhite,
Jr. LTC Betances died a few days
on 28 October 2001.
Ironically it was 49 years after that fateful day in 1952.
In January 2002 the Board for
Correction of Military Records formally published its finding that LTC
Carlos Betances-Ramirez had been treated
in an “inequitable”
manner. After 49 years, the Army officially admitted that they
treated him unfairly. His files and the official history of the
were officially modified to reflect this fact in March 2002.
Presently two fellow researchers
I have written to the President of the United
States and requested that the
92 Puerto Rican soldiers, who had been court-martialed, be officially
We also requested that the 65th Infantry Historical Review, prepared by
Center of Military
History, be formally released to the
We are still waiting for a response.
ABOUT THIS STORY:
The above story was prepared
on copies of historical reports at the National Archives, court-martial
documents, personal accounts, letters from the period given to the
author, books on
the Korean War, by both Continental and Puerto Rican authors, and
personal interviews with the Korean War veterans of the 65th Infantry
have deliberately removed the names of some of the Veterans to protect
their privacy. I am solely responsible for the content of this story.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Colonel Baltazar (Bart) Soto, is a 1976
of the ROTC and the
University of Puerto
Rico. He is a U.S.
Army Reserve Officer and graduate of the Command and General Staff