A review of the performance of the U.S. Army's Hispanic 65th
Infantry Regiment in the Korean War provides important insights not only into
the regiment's unique problems, but also into the status of the U.S. Army
at one of the most critical junctures in its history. It underscores the
importance of NCOs and the impact of integration on combat readiness and
battlefield successes. What has been called "The Forgotten War" remains rich
in lessons that the Army of today can never afford to forget if it is to
succeed on the battlefields of tomorrow.
Between September 1950 and December 1951, the 65th Infantry Regiment
established a reputation as one of the 3rd Infantry Division's most dependable
formations in Korea. Manned by Puerto Rican troops and commanded by predominantly
white officers, the regiment was a well-led, well-trained and disciplined
formation. "The Puerto Ricans forming the ranks of the gallant 65th ...
are writing a brilliant record of heroism in battle," wrote Gen. Douglas
MacArthur, "and I am indeed proud to have them under my command." By the
end of 1951, the officers and men of the regiment had garnered four Distinguished
Service Crosses and more than 125 Silver Stars. "Its performance was superb.
We were very proud of our regiment's action," recalled Capt. Fernandez-Duran,
a Puerto Rican officer of the 1st Battalion. "There was never any fear
or cowardice displayed by anyone in our unit. Leadership was superb, and
most of the soldiers were veterans and Regular Army. As to discipline, nothing
was left to be desired."
The regiment's combat effectiveness, however, deteriorated rapidly in
1952. The 65th experienced its first major failures at Outpost Kelly and
Jackson Heights in the Ch'orwon Valley of North Korea during September and
October 1952. Losing both outposts to sustained Chinese attacks and failing
to regain them, the regiment suffered more than 500 battle casualties in
one month. Afterward, 95 men of the regiment were court-martialed and convicted
of desertion, misbehavior before the enemy and disobeying the orders of a
superior officer. Blaming the failure on the inability of the regiment's
soldiers to understand English, Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens moved
quickly to remit the sentences and granted clemency and pardons to all those
involved.
The problem, however, was far more complicated than that. A number of
interrelated factors had caused the deterioration of the 65th. Across the
Eighth Army, these factors included a shortage of officers and NCOs, a rotation
policy that gutted infantry units of combat-experienced leaders and soldiers
and made sustained training impossible, tactical doctrine that resulted in
high casualties, an artillery ammunition shortage and declining morale. Other
infantry regiments in Korea experienced deterioration analogous to that of
the 65th, and some displayed similar shortcomings on the battlefield as well.
At the division level, factors at play included feeble leadership, an unreliable
artillery brigade and a command environment guilty of ethnic and organizational
prejudice. (The division commander was in fact relieved after the battle
for Outpost Kelly.)
Factors within the 65th contributing to the failure included a catastrophic
shortage of NCOs, language problems and inept leadership in a few key positions
(the regimental commander being relieved after the battle for Outpost Kelly).
That the Chinese communist forces had undergone a massive quantitative
and qualitative buildup in 1952 made these matters worse.
One cannot overstate the damage done by the large-scale diversion to
other units of the bilingual NCOs originally intended for assignment to
the 65th. The reliable link between an English-speaking Army and the regiment's
Spanish-speaking soldiers simply disappeared. The shortage of NCOs was exacerbated
in the 65th by other personnel assignment policies. Although only Puerto
Rican soldiers and sergeants could serve in the regiment, those who spoke
English could serve in any unit in Eighth Army. As a result, English-speaking
Puerto Rican NCOs were frequently diverted to other infantry units.
Prior to October 1951, Puerto Ricans had been limited to service in Puerto
Rico and Panama's Canal Zone except during time of war, when they had been
ordered to active theaters of operation.
A new policy went into effect in October 1951, making all English-speaking
insular Puerto Rican enlisted personnel immediately available for assignment
to any U.S. Army unit. The policy was attributed to the "outstanding record
of the 65th Infantry Regiment in Korea" and to "the excellent impression
the troops made on high ranking officers of the Army during Operation PORTREX
[Puerto Rican exercises] on Vieques Island in early 1950." Soldiers unable
to meet the English-language requirements continued to serve in Puerto
Rican units.
The policy of assigning Hispanics to units other than the 65th in Korea
preceded the official announcement by a good margin. It probably had as
much to do with personnel shortages as with the 65th's reputation prior
to and during the first year of the Korean War. In January 1951, Lt. Gen.
Matthew B. Ridgway, the new Eighth Army Commander, directed Maj. Gen. Robert
H. Soule, the 3rd Infantry Division Commander, to integrate Puerto Rican
replacements throughout the division rather than specifically assign them
to the all-Puerto Rican regiment. Soule attempted, unsuccessfully, to get
the new policy overturned.
There appear to have been two major factors behind Ridgway's order.
The first was related to the integration of the Eighth Army in Korea, and
the second, to the growing surplus of Puerto Rican soldiers arriving in
Korea in 1951.
Confronted with battle losses and a growing surplus of African-American
replacements arriving in Japan, the Eighth Army had been assigning them
to all-white units since August 1950. The practice accelerated during early
1951. Ridgway was a staunch supporter of integration in the Army, believing
racial segregation to be a highly inefficient use of manpower. He aggressively
sought authorization to integrate African-Americans in the Far Eastern Command
after he replaced MacArthur. On July 1, 1951, the Department of the Army
approved the policy.
The growing surplus of Puerto Rican soldiers arriving in Korea in 1951
was because of the large number of military-age Hispanic males available
for service on the island, their desire to serve in the Army and an expansion
of the training base on Puerto Rico. More than 7,000 Puerto Ricans underwent
military training at the island's Replacement Training Center between September
1950 and April 1951. The 65th, which deployed to Korea with a 10 percent
overage of personnel, was over strength for the first four months of 1951.
Although authorized 3,614 enlisted personnel, 3,910 were assigned in February
and 3,732 in March. Furthermore, of the 4,047 replacements received by the
3rd Division in April, 2,400 were Puerto Rican. This resulted in an excess
of 1,400 personnel in the 65th by the end of the month. Another 2,300 Hispanic
soldiers were en route to Korea and were scheduled to arrive in the near
future.
In response, Gen. Soule assigned Puerto Rican personnel to other units
in the division. According to Brig. Gen. O. P. Newman, the assistant commander
of the 3rd Infantry Division, this was part of an experiment aimed at assigning
1,000 Hispanic soldiers to combat and support throughout the division in
order to assess the impact of integration on the Army. Although unit commanders
initially complained, the withdrawal of these men six months later was
accomplished only with great difficulty. In a contemporary study that examined
the use of Puerto Rican troops in the Korean War, Col. William W. Culp
wrote, "The fact that so many men were so readily absorbed and that both
commanders and men resisted this transfer indicated that integration would
present no difficult problems."
The 3rd Infantry Division's regimental commanders agreed with this assessment.
A former commander of the 15th Infantry Regiment remembered receiving Hispanic
replacements in April. "They were integrated into the units of the 15th Infantry
as any normal replacements," recalled Col. T.R. Yancey. "I remember that
certain individuals who had previous experience in civilian life as mechanics
became particularly adept as members of maintenance crews of the heavy tank
company. They were placed in slots where it was estimated that they could
best perform their duty. Some, of course, were sent to squads where they
became proficient as riflemen. They worked well with the American soldier,
and I believe, although there is no definite proof, that the normal Puerto
Rican soldier replacement probably performs better with the 15th Regiment
than if he had been assigned to a unit of his own nationality. I am of the
opinion that the Puerto Rican soldier can be integrated through[out] our
continental units."
Yancey's notion that the Hispanic soldiers were not Americans was widespread
at the time. In fact, Puerto Ricans had been granted U.S. citizenship in
1917. Col. James O. Boswell, commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment, also
supported the integration of Hispanic troops. "These soldiers," he wrote,
"rapidly became first-class fighters, Š [and] except for political reasons
Š I feel that Puerto Ricans can be used to the best advantage for themselves,
for the Army and for the United States to have them integrated into continental
units." In his study, Col. Culp pointed out another advantage of integration:
"This method would also install a buffer against excessive losses by Puerto
Rico. Being a small island, should a Puerto Rican unit be annihilated in
combat or suffer excessive losses, it would have an adverse effect on the
Puerto Rican people."
Col. Juan Cesar Cordero, the regiment's Puerto Rican commander in the
fall of 1952, recognized that the policy of assigning English-speaking Puerto
Rican NCOs to any unit in Eighth Army worked against the regiment. Since
the definition of English-speaking could be liberally interpreted, few Puerto
Rican NCOs arriving in Korea found their way to the regiment. This policy
thus deprived the 65th of not only an essential element of leadership, but
also of badly needed bilingual sergeants to act as the link between English-speaking
officers and their Spanish-speaking troops. Complaints of NCO shortages
in the regiment surfaced as early as September 1951, when Col. Erwin O.
Gibson wrote:
"It is recommended that more experienced Puerto Rican Non-Commissioned
Officers be assigned to the 65th Infantry Regiment. This [unit] is limited
to Puerto Rican enlisted personnel, and although enlisted replacements have
been fairly adequate, there have been practically no NCO replacements. This
has placed a terrific strain on this regiment in attempting to maintain
a proper or even minimum level of experienced NCOs."
The NCO shortage reached critical proportions prior to the battle for
Outpost Kelly. Col. Cordero attempted to remedy the situation afterward by
recommending that additional all-Puerto Rican units be formed to absorb the
excess personnel not serving in the 65th. His reasoning was that, because
Spanish would be the predominant language of such units and that those units,
like the 65th, would receive a modified ration, morale would be higher and
Puerto Rican soldiers would perform better.
Cordero believed that such units, if formed, would come under his command
and would provide a trained reserve for the 65th Infantry. By the time
the recommendation was made, however, the process of assigning Hispanic
troops to units throughout the Far Eastern Command was too far along to
be reversed.
The assignment of English-speaking Puerto Rican NCOs to Eighth Army units
other than the 65th and the individual rotation policy stripped the Puerto
Rican regiment of its sergeants. From January to September 1952, the regiment
rotated 8,700 men, more than twice its authorized strength, of whom almost
1,500 were experienced NCOs in the upper three grades. In return, only 435
sergeants arrived to replace the losses, and by September some of these had
become casualties. As a result, company commanders were forced to assign
inexperienced privates and privates first class to key positions throughout
their platoons. These men commanded squads and acted as platoon sergeants,
positions normally reserved for sergeants and sergeants first class. The 65th
had only 381 NCOs out of an authorized strength of 811 in the upper three
grades when the battle for Outpost Kelly took place. Many of these had been
developed from recent replacements. At the same time, some 1,500 to 2,000
Puerto Rican sergeants and soldiers were serving in other Eighth Army units.
The lack of experienced platoon sergeants and corporals seriously undermined
the combat efficiency of the regiment. Cordero believed that this deficiency
was counterbalanced by the high esprit de corps of the regiment, "which
is motivated by the pride the Puerto Rican soldiers feel for this unit."
In many cases, however, as soon as company commanders and platoon leaders
became casualties, the inexperience of squad and platoon level NCOs became
all too apparent. There were more and more failures to sustain the momentum
of attacks and an increasing tendency on the part of the men to become confused
and disorganized after their officers had become casualties. Cordero recommended
that the 65th receive a monthly quota of 400 sergeants, including a fair
proportion of the upper three grades, so that he could remedy this basic
weakness. He further recommended that Puerto Rican sergeants assigned to
other units in the Far Eastern Command be transferred to the 65th "insomuch
as no continental NCOs are being assigned to this organization." The 3rd
Infantry Division, however, was unable to remedy the problem prior to the
regiment's defeat at Jackson Heights.
The collapse of the 65th, the courts-martial and the ensuing public outcry
prompted the Army to integrate the regiment. In the spring of 1953, the 65th
was reconstituted as a fully integrated unit by transferring thousands of
Hispanic soldiers to units throughout Eighth Army and bringing in thousands
of white and black personnel. Only a small core of 250 Puerto Ricans remained.
The 65th thus ceased to be a true Puerto Rican unit. In June, the regiment
redeemed itself, winning 14 Silver Stars, 23 Bronze Stars for valor and
67 Purple Hearts at the battle for Outpost Harry. The 65th's colors remained
in Korea until November 1954, when the regiment returned to Puerto Rico.
The unit had been decorated with the Presidential Unit Citation, a Meritorious
Unit Commendation, two Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citations and
the Gold Bravery Medal of Greece. In all, some 61,000 Puerto Ricans served
in the U.S. Army during the Korean War. Some 750 were killed and more than
2,300 wounded, losses that might have been reduced had the regiment been
integrated earlier in the war. Today, only the 1st Battalion remains as part
of the Puerto Rico National Guard, a testimony to a unique regiment that
has served the United States for a hundred years.
LT. COL.(P) GILBERTO VILLAHERMOSA, a native of San Juan, Puerto
Rico, and a 1980 West Point graduate, is a senior military historian at the
U.S. Army Center of Military History. His father was a soldier in the 65th
Infantry Regiment during the Korean War.
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