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"Honor and Fidelity"
The 65th Infantry Regiment in Korea
1950 - 1954
Official Army Report on the 65th
Infantry Regiment in the Korean War
LTC Gilberto Villahermosa
September 2000
U.S. Army Center of Military History
Table
of Contents
Executive Summary
Introduction
Formation of the Regiment
World War I
World War II
Post War Period
The Korean War : 1950
The Korean War : 1951
The Korean War : 1952
The Battle for Out Post Kelly
(September 1952)
The Battle for Jackson Heights
(October 1952)
Reasons for Failure
Aftermath : Courtmartial and
Reconstitution
End Notes
Home Page
Executive Summary
A review of the performance of the
Puerto Rican 65th Infantry in the Korean War provides important insights not
only into the regiment’s unique problems, but also into the status of the
United States Army at one of the most critical junctures in its history. They
underscore the impact personnel rotation policies, racial and organizational
prejudices, and small unit leaders can have on combat readiness and battlefield
successes. What has been called “The Forgotten War” is thus
rich in lessons the Army of today can never afford to forget if it is to
succeed on the battlefields of tomorrow.
Between September 1950 and
December 1951, the 65th, a Regular Army regiment since 1908, established a
reputation as one of the 3rd Infantry Division’s best and most dependable
formations. It was well led, well trained, and highly motivated. The
quality of the regiment in combat however, deteriorated rapidly in the Fall of
1952, when major failures occurred at Outpost Kelly and
As a result, 95 men of the
regiment were court-martialed and convicted of desertion, misbehavior before
the enemy, and disobeying the orders of a superior officer. Although
Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens moved quickly to remit the sentences and
granted clemency and pardons to all those involved, the court-martials have
left a lasting mark on the veterans of the 65th and the people of Puerto Rico.
A number of interrelated factors
influenced the failure of the 65th, many of them related to conditions
prevalent within Eighth Army and the 3rd Infantry Division. At the army
level, these included a shortage of officers and NCOs, a rotation policy that
removed combat-experienced leaders and soldiers and made sustained training
impossible, tactical doctrine that resulted in high casualties, an artillery
ammunition shortage, and declining morale. At the division level, they
included poor leadership, a weak artillery brigade, and a command environment guilty
of ethnic and organizational prejudice. Factors within the 65th contributed to
the failure as well. They included a catastrophic shortage of NCOs,
language problems, and inept leadership. That the Chinese were by then at
their best only made matters worse.
The heavy cumulative effect of all
these influences was simply too great for the men of the 65th to bear. In
the end, the regiment, which suffered as much, if not more, from these problems
than any other
· The Army reconstituted the 65th as
a fully integrated regiment in the Spring of 1953. By June, the regiment
had redeemed itself, winning 14 Silver Stars, 23 Bronze Stars for valor, and 67
Purple Hearts in the battle for Outpost Harry. The unit’s colors
remained in
In all, some 61,000 Puerto Ricans
served in the
Introduction
A review of the performance of the Puerto Rican 65th
Infantry in the Korean War provides important insights not only into the
regiment’s unique problems, but also into the status of the
Between September 1950 and December 1951, the 65th, a Regular Army regiment
since 1908, established a reputation as one of the 3rd Infantry
Division’s best and most dependable formations. It was well
led, well trained, and highly motivated. The quality of the regiment in
combat however, deteriorated rapidly in the Fall of 1952, when major failures
occurred at Outpost Kelly and
A number of interrelated factors influenced the failure of
the 65th, many of them related to conditions prevalent within Eighth Army and
the 3rd Infantry Division. At the army level, these included a shortage
of officers and NCOs, a rotation policy that removed combat-experienced leaders
and soldiers and made sustained training impossible, tactical doctrine that
resulted in high casualties, an artillery ammunition shortage, and declining
morale. At the division level, they included poor leadership, a weak
artillery brigade, and a command environment guilty of ethnic and
organizational prejudice. Factors within the 65th contributed to the failure as
well. They included a catastrophic shortage of NCOs, language problems,
and inept leadership. That the Chinese were by then at their best only
made matters worse.
The heavy cumulative effect of all these influences was
simply too great for the men of the 65th to bear. In the end, the
regiment, which suffered from these problems as much, if not more, than any
other
The Army reconstituted the 65th as a fully integrated
regiment in the Spring of 1953. By June, the regiment had redeemed
itself, winning 14 Silver Stars, 23 Bronze Stars for valor, and 67 Purple
Hearts in the battle for Outpost Harry. The unit’s colors remained
in
Formation
of the Regiment
The first body of Puerto Rican troops formed for
On
World War I
At the outbreak of hostilities in April 1917, the U.S. Army
established two Puerto Rican National Guard regiments, the predecessors of the
295th and 296th. The following month, the
In June 1918, the 373rd, 374th, and the 375th, were created.
The
Although more than 236,000 Puerto Ricans registered for
service, only 18,000 were called to the colors in World War I.[5] In addition,
Puerto Rico provided the U.S. Army with 706 Infantry officers.[6] Battle
casualties include 1 Killed In Action (KIA) and 4 Wounded In Action (WIA),
reflecting the non-combat status of the Puerto Ricans serving in the Army. The
average Puerto Rican soldier was 21 to 30 years old and served about 9 ½ months.[7]
Although the bulk of the Puerto Ricans served in the Puerto Rico Regiment of
Infantry and the 373rd, 374th, and 375th Infantry Regiments, a number also
served in the 42nd Infantry Regiment in Panama guarding America’s vital
sea-to-sea link through the Panama Canal.[8]
On 14 September 1920, the Puerto Rico Regiment of Infantry
became the 65th Infantry Regiment. Between World War I and World War II,
many Puerto Ricans served in the 65th, 295th, and 296th Infantry Regiments in
World War II
In June 1940, after the outbreak of hostilities in
By December 1941, nearly 58,000 troops were stationed in
Puerto Rico, Panama, and along the vast arc stretching from Surinam, north
along the Antilles screen, to the Yucatan Channel.[10] The induction of
additional Puerto Rican troops allowed the deployment overseas of growing
numbers of continental troops. By the beginning of 1942 some 17,000
Puerto Ricans were under arms in the
On
In January 1944, the regiment embarked for
The 3rd Battalion was detached from the regiment and sent to
In September 1944, the remainder of the regiment received
orders to move to
The 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Juan
Cesar Cordero-Davila, went into combat on 12 December 1944 at Peira Cava in the
Maritime Alps of southern France, where it relieved a battalion of the 442nd
“Nisei” Infantry Regiment. On 4 January 1945, Colonel George
A. Ford, the regimental commander, was killed by rifle fire while leading a
combat patrol against a German strongpoint.[13] On 15 January Sergeant
Angel Martinez and Private Sergio Sanchez-Sanchez of Company L were killed, the
first Puerto Rican soldiers of the 65th to die in combat in the European
Theater.[14] The 3rd Battalion was relieved from the Maritime Alps on 26
February 1945, and the entire regiment concentrated in Lorraine for further
action in southwest Germany. In March 1945, the 65th crossed the
Although the most prominent, the 65th was not the only
Puerto Rican infantry regiment to serve in World War II. The 295th saw
service in Curacao, Aruba, Surinam, Trinidad, Cuba, and Jamaica, and the Army
used a platoon of volunteers from the regiment for live mustard gas tests while
in Panama.[17] The 296th Regimental Combat Team served in Hawaii from 8
May 1945 to 7 March 1946 and was preparing for deployment against the Japanese
when the war ended. Puerto Rican support units, such as the 245th Quartermaster
Company, also served in the European and Burma Theaters.[18]
More than 65,000 Puerto Ricans served in the U.S. armed
forces in World War II (including 171 women), the great majority in
Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and throughout the Caribbean guarding vital
installations. Some 368 Puerto Ricans died in service during the
war.[19] Almost 350,000 Puerto Ricans registered for service during World
War II.[20]
Post-War
Period
Immediately upon return to Puerto Rico, the 65th Infantry
Regiment was reorganized. The 1st Battalion was stationed at Losey Field,
while the 2nd went to
During the following months, the 65th Regimental Combat
Team, which included the 65th Infantry Regiment, the 504th Field Artillery
Battalion, the 531st Engineer Company, and a tank company of the 18th
Mechanized Cavalry Squadron, conducted intensive training at Salinas Training
Area.[21] The regiment participated in the Atlantic Fleet Exercises of
1948 and 1949 near Vieques Island. Both culminated in an amphibious
assault, which saw the 65th attached to the 2nd Marine Division. Senior
Army and Marine officials praised the regiment for its outstanding
performance.[22]
In 1950 the regiment participated in PORTREX (Puerto Rican
Exercise), an expanded version of the Atlantic Fleet Exercises, as the
aggressor force defending Vieques. During the exercise, the men of the
65th stopped the landings of the 3rd Infantry Division on the beaches and
inflicted heavy casualties on a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division jumping
onto
The Atlantic Fleet Exercises of 1948 and 1949 and the
PORTREX maneuvers of 1950 provided the 65th Infantry and its Puerto Rican
soldiers with a great deal of positive exposure. This would play a major
role in the Army’s decision to deploy the regiment to
The
Korean War: 1950
The invasion of South Korea by the North Korean
People’s Army (NKPA) found elements of the 65th scattered among three
different posts on Puerto Rico, conducting small unit tactical training.
Although authorized almost 4,000 personnel, the regiment had only 92 officers
and 1,895 enlisted men.[25] It was composed entirely of Puerto Rican
enlisted personnel, the majority World War II veterans with many years of
service in the regiment. About 60 percent of the officers were continental and
40 percent were Puerto Rican. In June 1950 the unit consisted of two
infantry battalions, a Headquarters Company, a Service Company, a recently
activated Heavy Mortar Company, and a Medical Company.[26] All units were
understrength in officers and men, a state of affairs common throughout the
Army.[27] Furthermore, the Heavy Mortar Company lacked 4.2-inch mortars,
ammunition, and firing tables.[28]
Colonel William W. Harris commanded the regiment. He
was a West Point graduate and World War II veteran, as were the
regiment’s Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel George W. Childs, and
1st Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Howard B. St. Clair. Harris
would later advance to General Officer rank, while two of his three original
battalion commanders would go on to command infantry regiments, a testimony to
the fine leadership present within the 65th at the onset of the war.
On 11 August, the 65th was alerted for overseas
movement and directed to come to war strength with a readiness date of
From 11 to 22 August, 600 Puerto Ricans were recruited for
service with the regiment. Another 1,200 members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps
were also recalled. World War II veterans made up the vast majority of
those who joined up. The bulk spoke both Spanish and English. “I could
have recruited 50,000,” remembered Harris.[31] Although the comment was
an exaggeration, enthusiasm for military service ran high in Puerto Rico, whose
Governor, Luis Muñoz-Marin, had offered to form an all-Puerto Rican division of
18,000 men for the U.S. Army.[32] Prior to deploying, Harris and Sibert
arranged for the creation of a personnel replacement center for the regiment in
Puerto Rico. This initiative would pay substantial dividends for the regiment
once it reached
Early on the morning of 27 August 1950, the 65th Infantry
sailed out of San Juan for the Panama Canal Zone. It arrived in
The 65th arrived in
Between 23 September and 31 October, the 65th Regimental
Combat Team (RCT) (which included the 58th Field Artillery Battalion, a company
from the 10th Engineer Battalion, and a battery from the 3rd Anti-Aircraft
Artillery Battalion) was engaged in blocking the escape routes north of
isolated NKPA units and in antiguerrilla operations. The RCT’s most
significant engagement occurred on the morning of 17 October when 500 North
Korean soldiers attacked Company E at Kumpchon. The company killed 79 enemy and
captured 85 prisoners, while suffering 11 killed and 13 wounded.
At various times the 65th was attached to IX Corps, the 2nd
Infantry Division, and the 25th infantry Division or acted as the Eighth Army
reserve.[36] From 23 September to 31 October, the regiment inflicted more than
1,500 casualties on the enemy while suffering 221. During that period the
men from the regiment won five Silver Stars for gallantry in combat.[37]
Responding to a query from Puerto Rico on the state and performance of the
regiment in
At the end of October, the 65th was attached to General
Almond’s X Corps. On 4 November it moved to Pusan and then to
Wonsan, North Korea, by ship, arriving there the next day as the lead element
of Major General Robert H. Soule’s 3rd Infantry Division, which had
recently arrived in theater.
At the end of November the Chinese attacked
The Korean War: 1951
During January 1951, the 65th Infantry participated in
Operation Thunderbolt, a reconnaissance in force, and Operation Exploitation,
an exploitation to the Han River. The combat it encountered was described
as light to moderate.[40] By the end of the month, the regiment had
advanced to a region just south of
In February and March, the 65th participated in Operation
Killer and Operation Ripper aimed at the destruction of enemy forces. Task
Force Myers, consisting of the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance
Platoon, the Regimental Tank Company, Company G and attached artillery and
tactical air command group, attacked north against heavy enemy
resistance. It was the first element of the 3rd Infantry Division to
reach the southern banks of the
In April the regiment participated in Operation Dauntless,
leading the 3rd Infantry Division’s attack and defeating elements of the
Chinese 26th Army. On 19 April, two members of the regiment, Sergeant
Modesto Cartagena and Corporal Nieves-Laguer, both of Company C, won the
Distinguished Service Cross during assaults on enemy defensive positions near
Yonchon. Sergeant Cartagena knocked out five CCF defensive positions with
hand grenades until seriously wounded. Corporal Nieves-Laguer, an automatic
rifleman, repeatedly charged Chinese dugouts, killing the defenders and
allowing the remainder of his squad to advance. Nieves-Laguer also made
three separate trips across fireswept terrain, evacuating three badly wounded
comrades to safety.[43]
During the Chinese Spring Offensive in April, the 65th
defended its position against the vanguard of two CCF divisions, withdrawing in
an organized fashion when ordered to do so. As the Eighth Army retreated
southward, the regiment counterattacked aggressively whenever the opportunity
presented itself. Between May and July, the 65th participated in
operations to seize and hold the Chorwon Valley and was instrumental in
stopping Communist counterattacks in the Iron Triangle (Chorwon –
Pyonggang – Kumhwa) area.[44]
In September, the regiment experienced its first major
tactical failure when it was unable to seize a series of hills against two
enemy battalions in the Chorwon Valley during Operation Cleanup, despite
substantial support from all elements of the 3rd Infantry Division. It
was the worst day in combat for the regiment and the division since their
arrival in
On 1 October Private Badel Hernandez-Guzman of Company I won
the Distinguished Service Cross during an attack near Chorwon.
Hernandez-Guzman, who had been in Korea only two months, single-handedly
cleared a series of CCF defensive positions with a flamethrower, allowing his
company, which had been pinned down, to continue the attack.[46]
By the end of its first year in Korea the 65th had suffered
a total of 1,510 battle casualties and was credited with 15,787 enemy KIA and
2,169 enemy Prisoners Of War (POWs).[47] The officers and men of the
regiment had won 4 Distinguished Service Crosses and 125 Silver
Stars.[48]
When asked by officers of the regiment in February 1951 why
the unit had spent so much time on the front lines, Brigadier General Armistead
D. Mead, the Assistant Division Commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, replied
that the unit was the strongest regiment in the division. It had arrived
in
The
Korean War: 1952
At the beginning of 1952 both UN and Chinese forces were
occupying static positions. January found the 65th defending along Line
Lindsey, however, would command for less than three
months.[52] On 1 February 1952, Colonel Juan Cesar Cordero-Davila assumed
command of the 65th. Cordero-Davila was a Puerto Rican National Guard
officer who had served with the regiment in World War II for over three and a
half years, advancing from the Regimental S-4 to Battalion Executive Officer,
Battalion Commander, and Regimental Executive Officer. He also served for
short periods during World War II as the Regimental Commander. Following
the war, he had commanded the 296th Regimental Combat Team in
General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, was
responsible for Lindsey’s removal and the appointment of Cordero-Davila
to command the 65th. Cordero-Davila had solicited an assignment to Korea
when Collins visited Puerto Rico in January 1952.[54] Collins believed
that, in the long term, it would be of great value to the future of the Puerto
Rican National Guard if Cordero-Davila were assigned to the regiment.
General Matthew B. Ridgway,
Cordero-Davila was clearly one of the highest ranking ethnic
officers in the Army. His assignment to command the 65th reflected a
fundamental change in the Army’s attitude toward non-white officers and
took place against a backdrop of the full integration of African Americans into
Eighth Army. No African American officer had ever advanced so far.
The 65th spent February defending a sector on Line
The Battle for Outpost Kelly (September 1952)
By the beginning of the Fall of 1952, the Chinese had
completed a major quantitative and qualitative buildup and were becoming
increasingly aggressive in the contest for control of the high ground forward
of Eighth Army’s main defensive line. Intent upon gaining a better
position prior to the onset of winter and concerned with gaining leverage in
the peace talks through victories on the battlefield, the Communists made the
western and central sectors of the UN Command’s main line of resistance
the focus of fierce and bitter fighting. A number of key Allied outposts
were of particular interest to the CCF, including Outpost Kelly, defended by
the 65th Infantry.[57]
The 65th’s area of responsibility encompassed a
six-kilometer stretch of the UN line in the vicinity of Yonchon, North
Korea. Opposing the regiment were elements of the 39th CCF Army, an
experienced and well-led formation. The main object of contention was an
outpost line consisting of seven isolated strongpoints located about a mile
forward of the 65th’s main defensive position on Line
Enemy patrols and artillery barrages increased throughout
the month as the Chinese probed for soft spots. The 65th responded with
its own artillery and called in air strikes. On 17 September the Chinese
launched their first concerted attack on Outpost Kelly, which was located three
miles south of Kyeho-Dong and about one mile west of a double bend of the
Company E executed the first counterattack against the
outpost on the morning of 19 September. Some of its elements managed to
retake the outpost position, but the Chinese responded with such concentrated
artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire, that the company abandoned
it. The 65th called in some 2,000 artillery rounds in support of the
attack. Company E suffered 33 casualties.[61]
The regiment launched its 1st Battalion against the outpost
on the night of 20 September following heavy
Artillery and air strikes pounded Kelly between 21 and 23
September. On the morning of the 24th, the 3rd Battalion’s three
companies launched what all hoped would be a final counterattack.
Lieutenant General Paul W. Kendall, the I Corps Commander, and Major General
Robert L. Dulaney, the 3rd Infantry Division Commander, observed the
assault. A 30-minute artillery concentration by the 58th Field Artillery
Battalion along with direct fire from the 65th Tank Company and the 64th Tank
Battalion preceded the attack. Again, however, intense Chinese artillery
and mortar fire caused widespread confusion and panic in the attacking
companies and prevented the battalion from retaking its objective.
Companies I and K disintegrated during the withdrawal.[63] More than
10,000 artillery rounds and 11 air sorties were flown in support of the 65th
throughout the day.[64]
At the end of the month, Kelly remained in enemy hands, as
did Outpost Big Nori, another position manned by the 65th Infantry that had
fallen to the Chinese on 25 September. The regiment suffered 408 battle
casualties during the month of September, the bulk at Outpost Kelly. This
was the highest number of battle casualties it had suffered in an engagement
since its arrival in
The 65th was hardly the only regiment to suffer setbacks
during September. The Eighth Army lost five other positions elsewhere
during the month. Even so, the units that lost
As a direct result of that loss, General Kendall relieved
both the divisional and regimental commanders. Even prior to the loss of
Kelly, Kendall considered the 3rd to be the weakest of his divisions and its
artillery the weakest in his corps.[66] General Van Fleet agreed with his
assessment and wrote General Mark W. Clark, Far East Command Commander, to
request the relief of Dulaney.[67]
Kendall also recommended the relief of the 65th’s
commander. Describing Cordero-Davila’s behavior during the battle
for OP Kelly, he wrote that: “Colonel Cordero became…[so] nervous
that…[by] the end of the action he was utterly incapable of commanding
his regiment. His speech was incoherent and his judgement was utterly
futile.”
The Battle of Jackson Heights (October 1952)
During October, Chinese forces launched yet another series
of strong local offensive operations aimed at seizing key terrain in Eighth
Army’s western and central sectors. These included an attack
against
Colonel DeGavre assumed command of the regiment on 11
October, while the 65th was in IX Corps reserve near
On 22 October the regiment moved from Changmol to Topi-dong,
two miles north of Chorwon, to relieve elements of the 51st ROK Regiment, 9th
Division, on Line Missouri.
The outpost at Jackson Heights was located on the eastern
edge of the Chorwon Valley, approximately eight miles northeast of Chorwon and
six miles southwest of Pyonggang, North Korea.[78] It comprised the
southern portion of a large hill complex known as Iron Horse Mountain (Hill
388). The
Enemy action against the outpost followed closely on the
heels of the 65th’s arrival. Shelling began at 1100 on 25 October
and continued throughout the day and into the evening. Enemy patrols
probed the position twice the next morning but were repulsed each time.
Shelling continued that day, and by the evening of the 26th the 65th had suffered
a total of 24 casualties. Chinese shelling resumed at 1000 on the morning
of the 27th with much heavier concentrations than on the previous two days. In
short order a CCF mortar round hit Company G’s ammunition supply.
Much of the unit’s 60-mm. mortar ammunition went up in the conflagration
that followed. By 1245 the company had suffered another twelve wounded,
and its commander, Captain George D. Jackson, was radioing higher headquarters
for assistance in evacuating the company’s wounded from the position.
By 1700 all but seven members of the company’s Mortar Platoon were
casualties and only two mortars were still in action.[81] At 1800 Jackson
Heights received another heavy shelling, this time followed by a reinforced
company-size attack consisting of an estimated 250 men and supported by fire
from nearby enemy positions. Company G repelled the attack but at the
cost of 14 more friendly casualties.[82] That night, the company’s
listening posts detected large numbers of enemy troops positioning themselves
to the east and west of the position.
Tensions increased as night fell. Between 2035 and
2100 the Chinese unleashed an immense artillery and mortar barrage on
On 28 October, Colonel DeGavre ordered his 2nd Battalion
under Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Betances-Ramiez to retake
The attack began at 0645 on 28 October. By 0955
Company F was on the objective and was reporting it secured.[86] By 1115
both companies were on the hill, having taken 17 casualties while
inflicting 22 casualties on the enemy.[87] Although the operation had
gone extremely well, it soon began to deteriorate, with each company commander
thinking his stay on the position was temporary. In the confusion that
followed, the men of the two companies became intermingled, destroying the
cohesion of the outpost’s defense and presenting the Chinese with a
lucrative target. As enemy artillery and mortar rounds slammed into it,
inflicting numerous casualties, the defending troops began to move off the
position.[88] With the situation deteriorating the Company A Commander,
1st Lieutenant John D. Porterfield, called a meeting of his officers to decide
what to do next. The group had hardly convened, however, before a Chinese
76-mm. round fired from Camel Back scored a direct hit on it, killing
Porterfield, his artillery forward observer, and one of his platoon leaders,
along with an officer from Company F. The death of these leaders had an
immediate impact on the men, who began to abandon the position in even larger
numbers.[89]
Since communications with the two companies had gone down
during the attack, Colonel Betances-Ramirez only learned of the situation at
1500. He ordered Company F to remain on Jackson Heights and Company A to
return to the main defensive line. There matters stood until 1705, when
the 2nd Battalion command post received a message from Captain Cronkhite on
At 1715, a lieutenant from Company H reported that some 80
men from Companies A and F had congregated in the vicinity of Hill 270 and were
refusing to go back to
Early in the morning of 29 October, Company C, commanded by
1st Lieutenant Robert E. Stevens, departed the 1st Battalion area for
The 65th had suffered a total of 259 casualties for the
month, including 14 officers. Of these, 121, including 97 battle
casualties and 24 non-battle casualties, occurred while the regiment was
stationed on Line Missouri.[92] The reputation of the regiment and the
Puerto Rican soldier, which had suffered a heavy blow after the battle of
Outpost Kelly, was shattered irreparably. A total of 123 Puerto Rican
personnel, including one officer and 122 enlisted men, were in the division
stockade pending court-martial for refusing to attack the enemy as ordered and
misbehavior before the enemy.[93] The regiment’s only Puerto Rican
battalion commander, Colonel Betances-Ramirez, had been relieved of his command.
To make matters worse, on
The
Reasons for Failure
A number of interrelated factors influenced the failure of
the 65th in the Fall of 1952, many of them related to conditions prevalent
within Eighth Army and the 3rd Infantry Division. At the army level,
these included a shortage of officers and NCOs, a rotation policy that removed
combat-experienced leaders and soldiers and made sustained training impossible,
tactical doctrine that resulted in high casualties, an artillery ammunition
shortage, and declining morale. At the division level, they included poor
leadership, a weak artillery brigade, and a command environment guilty of
ethnic and organizational prejudice. Factors within the 65th contributed as
well. They included a catastrophic shortage of NCOs, language problems,
and inept leadership. That Chinese forces were by then at their best ony
made matters worse.
President Truman’s decision in 1951 to send another
four U.S. Army divisions to join the one already serving in Germany and then to
reduce the Army’s military personnel ceiling for Fiscal Year 1953 by
11,000 officers and 44,000 men exacerbated the Army’s shrinking manpower
pool. These two decisions resulted in troop reductions in
Rotation was another factor. In the Spring of 1952, the
Eighth Army Commander, General James A. Van Fleet, attributed the
“healthy mental state” of U.S. troops in Korea to the liberal
rotation policy that had been adopted early in 1951.[100] In World War II
GIs served until they were killed or seriously wounded or the war ended,
whichever came first. The policy in Korea, however, allowed soldiers to
rotate back to the United States after earning a specific number of rotation or
Constructive Months Service (CMS) points. To qualify for rotation during
1952, a soldier had to have nine months of service in the combat zone in
Rotations on such a massive scale gutted units of
combat-experienced leaders and soldiers, rendered effective training almost
impossible, and undermined unit cohesion and readiness. “It has
been, frankly, a mystery to me,” wrote General Collins to General Clark
in August 1952, “how the Eighth Army has been able to retain its combat
efficiency in light of the fact that we simply cannot furnish non-commissioned
officers and young officers from the States who have the experience comparable
to the men whom they replace in the Eighth Army.”[104] Major
General Hayden Boatner, who commanded the 2nd Infantry Division in
Colonel Cordero-Davila was of the same mind and, in fact,
attributed the poor performance of the regiment at Outpost Kelly to the
rotation policy. The 65th rotated 5,055 men between January and September
1952, one of the highest rates for any infantry regiment that year. As a
result, it was received more replacements over the same period than almost any
other infantry regiment in
Casualties also figured into the 65th’s
problems. Although Eighth Army tried to minimize them, pressure to hold
terrain while retaining the initiative and a tendency by commanders to
improperly execute Army tactical doctrine resulted in unnecessarily high
casualties.[108] An Army Field Forces report written in the Winter of
1952 indicated that the static situation in Korea had created an Army in which
few individuals had participated in a general offensive. As a
result, skills in offensive operations were lacking, despite Van Fleet’s
emphasis on local offensives and frequent patrols in order to prevent UN troops
from losing their fighting edge.[109] Too often, however, those
operations took on the form of high cost frontal attacks. Observing the
trend, General Collins grew increasingly concerned. Emphasizing that the
careful use of terrain in combat operations could shield troops from
unnecessary loss of life, he called upon his commanders to avoid frontal
assaults whenever possible. They were costly, he said.
Collins’ assertion was a virtual condemnation of the way the Army was
training its infantry officers in 1952 and the tendency of those officers to
opt for frontal attacks in Korea.[110]
Eighth Army policy regarding patrols and raids contributed
to the problem. Eighth Army methods called for extremely aggressive
action to dominate the space between the friendly and enemy main lines and to
capture prisoners for interrogation. In most corps and divisions, each
battalion on the main defensive line was required to send out at least one
patrol or raid a day in an effort to capture one prisoner every three
days.[111] The results of these methods rarely justified the costs.
“Personally,” wrote Major General A. H. Cassels, commander of the
British Commonwealth Division in the Spring of 1952, “I believe the reason
behind the order [to capture prisoners] was to keep the US Army divisions
‘sharp’ regardless of the casualties, and at least one of their
divisions has taken very considerable casualties – between 2,000 and
3,000.”[112]
The British Commonwealth Division, for example, suffered a
30 percent casualty rate during seven company-size raids in July 1952 in
pursuit of Chinese prisoners who produced little information of use.[113]
At least one U.S. Army regiment suffered more than 160 casualties (including 8
Missing in Action - MIA) in an unsuccessful attempt to capture a single Chinese
prisoner.[114] Between December 1952 and March 1953, UN forces dispatched
some 30,646 patrols resulting in 3,288 friendly casualties (including 116 MIA)
while inflicting 4,689 enemy casualties and taking 51 prisoners, a marginal
return, at best, considering the effort expended.[115]
The Eighth Army’s prescribed methods for defending an
outpost line were also problematic. According to
Mounting casualties added to the problem. The 65th
Infantry took a total of 1,648 casualties between January and August
1952. By the end of the year, it had suffered a total of 2,923
casualties, including more than 800 battle casualties. [121] This was
more than 90 percent of the regiment’s total strength and fairly
representative of the casualties suffered by the other infantry regiments in
Korea.[122]
Another factor contributing to the regiment’s failure,
especially at Jackson Heights, was a shortage of artillery ammunition. As
the war of movement came to an end in mid-1951, artillery assumed a new
importance, and ammunition expenditure increased significantly. By
October 1951, Eighth Army had only 25 percent of the required 155-mm. artillery
rounds, while medium and light artillery was rationed at about 50 percent of
the normal rate of fire. These shortages curtailed even limited offensive
capabilities and resulted in increased friendly casualties.[123] The
artillery ammunition shortage was one of the primary reasons for the
Army’s request for exorbitant amounts of close air support in
Korea.[124]
There were a number of reasons for the shortage.
First, was the unusually high rate of fire deemed necessary by General Van
Fleet to offset the enemy’s quantitative superiority. Second, there
were no ammunition production lines of any consequence in operation in the
Declining morale was another factor undermining the combat
effectiveness of Eighth Army in the Fall of 1952. With the initiation of
negotiations in July 1951, the tempo of operations on the battlefield had
slackened. With an early end to the fighting in prospect, UN commanders
and troops were eager to prevent unnecessary casualties. When the war
continued with no end in sight, however, the mission of occupying and defending
a static line for an extended period sowed uncertainty in the ranks.[127] Time
magazine correspondent John Osborne wrote in the Winter of 1952,
“soldiers see no purpose and no good in the kind of war they are
fighting….It is the quality born of their knowledge that they are not
expected to win. They are expected only to stand and hold, and perhaps to be killed
or maimed in the process. They are expected to leave their line on
occasion and walk through the night silence toward the enemy line, and on rare
occasions even to attack and harass the enemy…but almost never to take
the enemy line.”[128] The result was an environment in which many
junior leaders and soldiers shunned risk taking and, in effect, ceded the
initiative to the Chinese. Recognizing this, Van Fleet grew increasingly
frustrated with the nature of the war. “In
Factors unique to the 3rd Infantry Division also contributed
to the failure of the 65th. Weak leadership under Generals Dulaney and
Smythe was the most important of these. Prior to the fight at Outpost
Kelly, General Dulaney had failed to assess accurately the readiness of the
regiment for combat operations.[130] Furthermore, his leadership of the division
left much to be desired. In a letter to Lieutenant General John W.
O’Daniel, the former I Corps Commander, General Van Fleet wrote:
“The 3rd got steadily worse under Dulaney and a number of his
subordinates who didn’t seen to have the drive to keep it sharp.
Their bayonets got awfully rusty and dull after your departure.
“[131] O’Daniel responded: “Bob Dulaney, I thought when
I Ieft there, was fighting his problems rather than solving them and I told him
so. With his background, he certainly should have done a better job than
he did. I am afraid he developed a swelled head and was somewhat
bull-headed. That may account for his missing some of the things that he
should have seen and done.”[132] In the same way, neither acted to
alleviate the regiment’s chronic shortage of officers. Nor did the
3rd Infantry Division have an effective program for validating training as
other divisions had. Furthermore, little was done to rectify the failings
of the 65th evident after Outpost Kelly. There was no major shakeup in
the leadership of the regiment, no major influx of critically needed junior
officers or NCOs, no sustained and uninterrupted training period, and no rest
period of any significant length for the men traumatized by the Chinese
artillery and more than 400 battle casualties. Instead, Smythe rushed to
put the 65th, a clearly flawed unit, back on the line. No one should have
been surprised when the regiment failed. Indeed, the surprise was that
the regiment held
Division artillery was another problem. In his 18
September letter to Van Fleet, the I Corps commander had called the 3rd
Division artillery brigade the weakest in I Corps: “In recent tests of
the Division Artillery of the 2nd, 3rd, and 1st Marine Divisions, the artillery
of the 3rd Division was a poor third or last.”[134] The division
artillery failed to provide effective counterbattery artillery support at
either OP Kelly or
Finally, General Dulaney’s and General Smythe’s
handling of the 65th’s white and Puerto Rican officers reveals an uneven
standard of justice and indicates a great deal about the 3rd Infantry
Division’s attitude toward the regiment. The relief of the 65th’s
Puerto Rican regimental commander, Colonel Cordero-Davila, by Smythe was fully
warranted. A commander is, after all, responsible for everything his unit
does or fails to do. The relief of the regiment’s only Puerto Rican
battalion commander, Colonel Betances-Ramirez of the 2nd Battalion, by Dulaney,
however, was not. The 1st Battalion’s Company B was the unit that
lost Outpost Kelly, most likely because its men were asleep at their
posts.[136] In the same way, the 3rd Battalion’s Companies K and L
disintegrated while counterattacking at Outpost Kelly, their troops streaming
back in disorder. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion’s Company G, under
George Jackson, had held
Neither did Smythe have to court-martial the men of the
65th. Indeed, the recently adopted Uniform Code of Military Justice
provided him with a great deal of leeway. When 100 soldiers of the 2nd
Infantry Division abandoned their positions in July 1952 during the battle to
recapture Old Baldy and refused to return to the fighting, they were not
court-martialed, because the division commander, Major General J. C. Fry,
attributed the episode to confusion rather than cowardice. “They
were typical clear-eyed, good-looking American boys,” he said.
“They had probably been afraid… frightened to their very souls, but
they were not cowards.”[138] Fry lectured the men then monitored
their progress. Some were promoted or rotated home while others were
decorated for bravery. “None,” he reported, “has proven
cowardly.”[139] Fry, a veteran World War II combat commander, had taken
command of a fundamentally sound division. Smythe, also a World War II
veteran with impressive credentials as a combat commander, had inherited, on
the other hand, a weak division whose previous commander had been relieved. It
seems fair to conclude that the court-martial of the 65th’s men was more
an attempt to send a warning to the division than an effort to reform the
regiment. Indeed, that very point came out in the court-martials in testimony
that was very rapidly suppressed.
The 3rd Infantry Division’s actions with regard to the
regiment’s white officers stood in stark contrast to its actions against
the Puerto Rican officers and men of the 65th. The division took pains in
its official report on the episode to absolve its white officers of all
responsibility: “It should be noted that the conduct of continental
officers during this operation was excellent,” wrote the division
commander. “The Division Commander and the Assistant Commander during the
period feel that the continental officers of the 65th Infantry Regiment are
high-energy type leaders, with exceptional records.”[140]
Furthermore, the refusal of the 3rd Battalion’s Company L to continue
with its combat patrol in November resulted in neither the relief of the
regimental or the battalion commander, both of whom were white. Nor was
any action taken against either the company commander or platoon leaders.
Smythe also opted not to take any action against the officers and men of the
15th Infantry when a patrol from that regiment refused to follow its commander
to the still hotly contested position at
If racial prejudice was clearly present, organizational
factors also played a role in the way the 3rd Division handled the 65th.
The regiment did not really belong to the division but was under long term
attached status to it. General Soule, who brought the division to Korea,
treated the regiment as one of his own, spending a great deal of time with its
commanders and soldiers and ensuring that its men received their fair share of
awards. The relationship between the division and the regiment, however,
began to deteriorate after Soule departed in September 1951 and command fell to
Generals Cross, Dulaney, and then Smythe. Correspondence between General
Van Fleet and Cross, a veteran of three tours in the 3rd Division, indicates
that the Eighth Army’s commander wanted the 65th replaced with the 30th
Infantry Regiment. “Dear Tom,” wrote Van Fleet in December 1952,
“Your old division is coming along exceptionally fine under George Smythe
with the exception of the 65th. That will never be corrected until we can
restore to the division its old regiment now at
The combination of racial and organizational prejudice
manifested itself in not only the relief of Colonel Betances-Ramirez and the
court-martial of 94 of the regiment’s men, but also in the 3rd
Division’s distribution of awards. By August 1952, the officers and
men of the 65th had won 4 Distinguished Service Crosses and 126 Silver
Stars. In comparison, the 7th Infantry Regiment had won 18 Distinguished
Service Crosses and 423 Silver Stars while the 15th Infantry Regiment had
garnered 20 Distinguished Service Crosses and 239 Silver Stars.[144] The 65th
thus ended the year with considerably less than the division average of 14
Distinguished Service Crosses and 263 Silver Stars per regiment. This
occurred despite the fact that it had accrued almost two more months in combat
than the other regiments and had acquitted itself well, and sometimes with
distinction, in 1950 and 1951.
If racial prejudice played a role, however, personnel
policies unique to the all-Puerto Rican regiment pushed it over the brink. The
officer shortage placed a tremendous leadership burden on the NCOs of the
infantry regiments. In the 65th, however, the sergeants were simply not
there. Although only Puerto Rican sergeants could serve in the regiment,
those that spoke English could serve in any unit in Eighth Army as a result of
a change in personnel policy enacted in October 1951. Ironically, the reason
given for this change was the 65th’s solid performance in the Puerto
Rican Exercises of 1950 and in
By September 1952, the problem had reached crisis
proportions in the regiment. Although some 2,000 Puerto Rican soldiers,
including many NCOs, were serving in other regiments throughout
Part of the reason for that effect was language.[150]
The regiment was unique in that the officers and men used both English and
Spanish. By the Fall of 1952, the majority of enlisted men in the 65th spoke
only Spanish, while the majority of officers spoke only English. Language
had not been a major issue in 1950 and 1951 for the regiment. Most of the
unit’s NCOs and men were World War II veterans who spoke English
relatively well. In addition, many of the officers that brought the
regiment to
The NCO shortage and the problems it entailed were nothing
in comparison with a broader breakdown in leadership that was also occurring in
the 65th. Despite warnings from the division, commanders at all levels
failed to ensure that Outpost Kelly and
The quality of the 65th’s commander also figured into
the failure of the regiment. Despite his impressive credentials,
popularity with the men, and personal courage, Cordero-Davila proved to be more
interested in pandering to his men than in ensuring that they were disciplined,
well trained, and combat ready. Indeed, rather than rely on officers more
tactically and technically competent than himself, Cordero-Davila undermined
his officers’ and sergeants’ authority by establishing a
Privates’ Council consisting of a private from every platoon in the
regiment and meeting once a month. The council undercut the chain of
command by allowing soldiers to submit complaints directly to the regimental
commander. Cordero-Davila then intervened on behalf of the men, upsetting
policies his company and battalion commanders had set in place without
sufficient feel for the circumstances that had led to them in the first
place. As a result, discipline suffered.
In his report after the battle at Outpost Kelly, General
Dulaney wrote: “There was much to indicate that Colonel Cordero was not a
disciplinarian.”[152] A number of the 65th’s officers agreed
with his assessment. One lieutenant (who went on to become a Colonel)
described Cordero-Davila as “a totally inadequate officer” and
insisted that he was “incompetent, lacked basic knowledge of infantry
weapons and tactics” and “displayed inadequate leadership
skills.”[153] In a display of candor, he added that the
regiment’s commander was “overly pro-Hispanic to the detriment of
his largely continental officers.”[154] Clearly interracial
tensions were present in the regiment, even if they were usually well disguised
by displays of outward harmony. Another officer remembered: “There was no
discipline when I was just assigned to the 65th P.R. Regiment in
July–September 1952, directly attributable to the political CO
[Commander]. When my patrol bugged out the men that ran were verbally
admonished by the CO and I was told that the men would not do that
again!” [155] When Colonel DeGavre took command of the 65th in October,
the men had stopped saluting, cutting their hair and shaving, were cutting the
heels off their Army issued boots, carving the stocks of their weapons, and failing
to wear helmets on the front lines. He attributed the breakdown in discipline
directly to Colonel Cordero-Davila, whom he called a “Political”
commander.[156]
These circumstances not withstanding, the breakdown in
discipline DeGavre speaks of could hardly have been either as severe or as
widespread as the Colonel suggests. The fact that Company G was able to
hold Jackson Heights and that Company F was able to recapture it for as long
and as quickly as they did indicates that some soldiers of the regiment
retained a good measure of training, discipline, and tenacity. This could
be attributed directly to the caliber of small unit leaders. Captains
Jackson and Cronkhite, for example, were
The Chinese, of course, deserve a good deal of credit for
the 65th’s troubles. Their performance was a solid indicator of their
growing technical capabilities and tactical competence. The year 1952 saw
a steady buildup of enemy artillery, with the most significant increase
occurring between April and July.[158] This included the introduction of
new and more effective weapons such as the Soviet 152-mm. gun and improvements
in the supply of artillery ammunition.[159] Chinese and North Korean forces
began the year with 71 artillery battalions and 852 artillery pieces on the
front line. There were another 361 artillery battalions and almost 3,500
artillery pieces in their rear areas. In comparison, United Nations
forces deployed 66 artillery battalions and 1,200 guns in
Accompanying the growth in Chinese artillery was an increase
in the number of CCF artillery rounds fired in 1952. That increase began
in June and peaked in November. In January the CCF fired approximately 17,500
rounds a month in comparison with the 8,000 rounds fired in July 1951. By
August they were firing 70,400 rounds a month. The figure rose to 105,000
rounds in September and peaked in November 1952.[161] A growing sophistication
in artillery tactics accompanied those increases. Beginning in September 1952
the Chinese began to use massed preparatory fires prior to attacks while also
intensifying the bombardment of rear areas.[162] And their fire came from
positions located well to the rear, making it more difficult for friendly
artillery to conduct an adequate response.[163] One of the first
manifestations of the CCF’s ability to mass artillery effectively came at
Outpost Kelly against the 65th.
In addition to their growing technical and logistical
capabilities, the Communists also displayed a growing tactical competence and a
greater willingness to take the war to the enemy. Unlike the
The heavy cumulative effect of all these influences –
the shortage of officers and NCOs, the rotation policy, a casualty intensive
tactical doctrine, ammunition shortages, sagging morale, inept leadership, weak
division artillery, racial and organizational prejudice, and language
problems– was simply too great a burden for the 65th to bear.
In the end, the regiment, which suffered from these problems at least as much,
if not more, than any other
It is a tribute to the dedication and perseverance of the
men of the 65th that, in light of all this, they attacked as many times as they
did and were able to advance as far as they did, seizing both outposts, albeit
for short periods of time. As happens too often in war, they were let
down by their leaders at all levels.
Aftermath:
Court-Martial and Reconstitution
The 3rd Infantry Division pursued two tracks in dealing with
the 65th’s failures. The first entailed the largest mass
court-martials of the Korean War. The second was an attempt to have the
regiment inactivated and replaced by the 30th Infantry.
Shortly after
On 7 December the first group of enlisted men were
tried. The men, all from Company L, received dishonorable discharges,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances and 1–2 years confinement at hard
labor.[167] A group of 5 men from Company C, tried on 10 December
received 13 years confinement at hard labor.[168] Four men from Company L
tried on 15 December received 16 to 18 years confinement at hard labor.[169]
The last court-martial of the year was on 26 December when 11 men from Company
F were sentenced to five years at hard labor.[170] In January 1953,
the last four members of the regiment were tried and acquitted. In all,
of the 95 men court-martialed, 91 were found guilty. In addition to
confinement at hard labor, all the guilty were sentenced to dishonorable
discharges and total forfeiture of pay and allowances.
The Army kept the court-martials relatively quiet and
downplayed both the number of men tried and the severity of their
sentences.[171] By late-January 1953, however, newspapers in both the
The inability of the men of the 65th to speak English became
the Army’s official reason for the failure of the regiment in the Fall of
1952. Using this as justification, Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens
moved quickly to overturn the sentences. By 14 July he had granted
clemency to 56 of the 93 soldiers.[175] By 1954 all those sentenced had
received clemency or pardons. The majority returned to service in the
Army. Court-martial records make clear that, despite the appeals process,
the soldiers of the regiment would not have had their sentences overturned without
the intervention of Secretary Stevens.
While the court-martials were taking place the regiment was
being reconstituted. In November 1952, the 3rd Infantry
Division’s commander, General Smythe, recommended that a combat-trained
regiment be assigned to the division instead of the 65th. If that were
not possible, he suggested that an experienced regimental combat team replace
the 65th during the four months it would take to retrain the unit. If
those two options proved unfeasible, he requested that the division be
authorized to reconstitute the 65th with 60 percent Continental personnel from
other units and that all Puerto Ricans in excess of this figure be
redistributed throughout Eighth Army.[176]
Smythe’s recommendations were based on an investigation
conducted by Major John S. D. Eisenhower, the son of the then-President
Elect. In his memoirs Strictly Personal, Eisenhower, who was serving with
the 15th Infantry as a newly arrived Major in Korea, relates his appointment as
investigating officer into the failures of the 65th at Outpost Kelly and
Jackson Heights. According to Eisenhower, the 3rd Infantry Division commander
was less than impartial. “John, that regiment can’t fight the
way it’s set up,” Smythe said. “I want it thrown out of
the division or integrated with Puerto Ricans and Continentals like they are in
every other division. Now write a study and make it
logical.”[177] Eisenhower writes: “I set to work with
enthusiasm. For a few weeks I was to be the division G-3 projects
officer.”[178]
Major Eisenhower produced a study biased in the extreme
against the regiment. The study devoted less than half a page to the
65th’s record in 1950 and 1951 and more than five pages to its record in
1952 and its failures at OP Kelly and
Two days after receiving Smythe’s recommendations
(along with Eisenhower’s study), Lieutenant General Reuben Jenkins, the
IX Corps Commander, wrote to the Eighth Army commander. He noted that the
65th was “not a battle-worthy unit” and could not be made into a battle-worthy
unit with less than six months of training “and then only after it has
been assigned a large compliment of experience Regular Army noncommissioned
officers.”[180] He added that an all-Puerto Rican regiment could no
longer be justified and seconded Smythe’s recommendations. Jenkins
requested that the 30th Infantry be brought to full strength and transferred to
On 14 November, General Van Fleet requested that Department
of the Army deactivate the 65th. “In the early fighting in
Unit command reports do not support the contention that
Eighth Army, IX Corps or the 3rd Infantry Division attempted to remedy the
shortage in the 65th Infantry by assigning Continental NCOs in any significant
numbers to the regiment. Nor is it likely. The shortage of NCOs was
Eighth Army wide, suggesting that there were not many available to reassign to
the 65th. It is interesting that Van Fleet did not mention the almost
2,000 Puerto Rican soldiers, many of them NCOs, serving in other units in
Toward the end of February, the Department of the Army
directed that the 65th be reconstituted as a fully integrated formation with
non-Puerto Rican personnel assigned in the same proportion as in other
regiments in the Eighth Army.[185] With reconstitution scheduled for
early March, the unit relinquished its segment of Line Missouri at the end of
February and pulled into a reserve position near Chang-mol. In March, some
2,096 Puerto Rican enlisted personnel left the 65th to join other units.
In exchange 1,140 Continentals arrived. By the late Spring of 1953, the
regiment had lost its Puerto Rican identity.
The 65th was hardly the first American unit in
On 30 March, the newly reconstituted 65th began eight weeks
of intensive training.[188] On 16 May, the regiment occupied a sector on
Line
The 65th conducted raids against the CCF throughout
July. The last “aggressive” tactical operation of the Korean
War conducted by the regiment came on 27 July when a reconnaissance patrol from
Company B called in artillery fire on a group of Chinese soldiers.[192]
The truce ending the war was signed later at 1000 that same morning and the
cease-fire went into effect at 2200. From 1500 to 2145 the Chinese
shelled the entire regimental sector, including the regimental command post,
inflicting numerous casualties.
In all, some 61,000 Puerto Ricans served in the
Why did Puerto Ricans fight in Korea? Perhaps there was some
truth in Governor Muñoz-Marin’s words on the day the colors of the
regiment were transferred to the 296th: “The flag of the
End
Notes